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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
MERVIN J. RUSSELL and
ADA J. RUSSELL, his wife,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
GEYSER-MARION GOLD
MINING COMPANY, a
corporation, The BOTHWELL
CORPORATION,
a corporation, et al,
Defendants.

Case No.
10577

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
Plaintiffs respondents claim title to grazing
rights through conveyance and also by adverse possession, of the mining claims here involved.
Defendants claim by deed and to be record
owners in fee simple of all mineral, surface, and
grazing rights of all mining claims, and also assert
that any claims of plaintiffs are barred by limitations and latches and all rights are established in
defendants under the statutes and as record owners. Defendants further assert that all rights that
existed in plaintiffs' predecessors were at most an
assignable license, which rights were abandoned,
1
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extinguished and never asserted after 1044, and
that defendants have had exclusive possession of
and paid all taxes assessed on all mining claims
involved since 1934.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court found for plaintiffs and that
their predecessors for many years had grazed said
mining claims and retained title to use the surface
for grazing purposes upon payment of one-half of
all future general taxes. Said decision was bottomed
upon the conveyance of May 23, 1934, Ex. 2. The
decree further provided that the rights of plaintiffs
to quiet title are not barred by statutes plead or
any other statute of limitation, and in equity enjoined defendants from interfering with the same.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Since the court's decision sounds in equity,
and it is the prerogative and the duty of the appellate court to review both the law and the facts, defendants request the court to review the law and
the evidence and reverse the lower court with a
mandate that judgment be entered for defendants
and against plaintiffs with costs to defendants.
UNDISPUTED FACTS
The Abstract of Title, Ex. 15, shows that the
J orgensens were the owners in fee simple of all of
the mining claims here involved prior to June 7,
1932. In the conveyance called the first grant of
June 7, 1932 from Jorgensens to defendant and
2
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appellant, Geyse1·-Marion Gold Mining Company,
the following is recited:
"This grant is made subject to a reservation in the Grantors of all surface rights,
including existing springs and surface waters
in and upon said claims."
Thereafter, on May 24, 1934, the Jorgensens
or the same Grantors, by another conveyance called
the second grant, conveyed to Glen R. Bothwell all
of the mining claims conveyed in the former conveyance of June 7, 1932 and also other mining
claims, the aggregate of which constitute all mining claims involved in this litigation. In the second
grant dated May 24, 1934 and recorded May 31,
1934, Ex. 2, and abstract entry 106 no such words
as "subject to reservations" or "with reservations",
appear, and said conveyance, Ex. 2, after describing said claims contained the following:
"The Grantee herein agrees that the
Grantors shall have the right to use the surface of the ground for grazing purposes, the
grazing to be done in such a manner as not
to interfere with any mining that the Grantee elects to do. The Grantors agree to pay
one-half the general taxes assessed against
the land, as long as it is not used for mining
purposes."
"This deed is intended to convey any
after acquired title obtained by the Grantors."
The estate of Glen R. Bothwell or said grantee
under said second grant was probated and all rights
he had under said second grant, Ex. 2, were distri3
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buted to the legatees named in his estate as is shown
in the Decree of Distribution, Ex. 3. See also Entry
No. 117 of the Abstract. Thereafter, said legatees
conveyed all of said mining claims to the Bothwell
Corporation, Ex. 4. Abstract Entry 119. Thereafter, the Bothwell Corporation conveyed all of its
interest obtained under the second grant in all of
said mining claims to defendant and appellant,
Geyser-Marion Gold Mining Company. After recording Ex. 5 supplemental Abstract Entry 4,
Geyser-Marion had all interests conveyed under both
the first and second grant. The exhibits show that
all deeds were recorded. Subsequent to the recording of both the first and second grants aforesaid,
the J orgensens by a third transfer transferred only
"the grazing rights upon the following described
lands" to A. C. Nordell. See Abstract Entry No.
110, 111, and 112. Nordell grazed livestock on said
claims and paid one-half the general taxes thereon
to defendants for the years 1942, 1943, 1944. See
Ex. 7, 8, 9, 10 the original book entries, and Requests for Admissions for checks from A. C. Nordell's checking account and T259-15. Nordell transferred the interest he had in said property to Tony
Castango in 1945. Abstract Entry 154.
Castango tr an sf erred to Rose Castango in 1960
Ex. 22. Rose Castango's interest was transferred
to the Russells, the present plaintiffs, in 1960, supplemental Abstract Entry 6. The outline attached
to the first page of the cover outlines said transfers.
4
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Herein, Geyser-Marion Gold Mining Company
and its predecessors in interest shall be referred to
as defendant or Geyser-Marion and present plaintiffs, Russell, and plaintiffs' predecessors in interest shall be referred to as plaintiff.
The mining claims involved in the litigation
amount to about 608 acres. From and after 1944
Owen Ault grazed livestock on and leased all of
said mining claims from and paid rental to defendant each and every year until the commencement of
this action. Ex. 14 is the lease betwen Geyser-Marion
and Owen Ault involving the period immediately
preceding the filing of this action. Ex. 11, 12, 13
show the payment of rental by Ault to defendant
and Ex. 25 is the receipts and checks for rental
payments on said claims which Ault produced under
subpoena. Said lease, Ex. 14, contains about 2,200
acres, which defendant leases to Ault. Only 608
acres are involved in this litigation, they being mixed in among the other 1,500 acres, and some being
southwesterly of Mercur and the others being scattered among the said 1,500 acres in the vicinity of
Mercur, see Ex. 19. Ault also leased about 400 acres
of mining claims from Gover Gold Mining Company
and about 480 acres of mining claims from McCormick T204-l. The aggregate acreage of mining
claims leased by Ault was about 3,080 acres forming the solid area colored in green on Ex. 18, 203-28.
Mr. Roy Bothwell is and has been the presi5
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dent and director of defendant, Geyser-Marion since
1942, Tl36-17, and had handled mattern of the company in dealings with Mr. Ault who leased the
mining claims involved in this litigation from Geyser-Marion. Ault testified that he presumed the
Bothwells owned the Geyser-Marion claims, Tl5212. Ault testified that he ran livestock on said
mining claims every year without missing a year
since 1944 or 1945 and that he has never missed a
payment for the leasing of said claims, T154-9,
and Castango admitted Ault grazed same, T46-27,
T-48-8, T53-26 as also did Russell, T26-l.
Tl36-5 is further varification that Ault paid
the money to Bothwells as are the records produced
by Bothwell, president of Geyser- Marion, Ex. 11,
12 and 13. See also T204-19 and also Ex. 25 containing the checks and rental receipts produced by
Ault under subpoena.
Ault ran 1,400 head of shep on said claims for
20 years, Tl46-ll.
Ault stated he ran 40 head of cattle on said
claims since 1945, Tl59-l to 4.
Exhibit 18 is the personal map owned by the
lessee, Ault, which he produced under subpoena in
court, T24-20.
Ault spent all of his time in said area for 20
years, T145-27.
To color the map, Ex. 18, Ault took the claim
6
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numbers from the leases and located said claims
physically on the ground by blazes on trees and
monument numbers and colored the area in green
on Ex. 18, his map, Tl48-24.
All facts above related are undisputed, with no
evidence to the contrary.
ARGUMENT ON THE FACTS
POINT I.
WHERE EVIDENCE IS CONTRARY TO THE FINDING OF THE COURT PLAINTIFF FAILS IN BURDEN
OF PROOF AND DEFENDANT PREVAILS PARTICU
LARL Y IN AN EQUITY CASE.

From the entire period from 1944 to 1957 Tony
Castagna is the only predecessor, through which
plaintiffs must prove possession or the grazing of
said mining claims or any rights with respect thereto. Castagna admitted that he had never tried to
locate a mining claim and could not locate a claim,
and on direct examination for plaintiffs' case,
testiied as follows:
T45-30 Q. Mr. Castagna, are you acquainted with the general location of the mining claims described in the deed I showed you
on the ground?
A. Well, I couldn't point them out just
where they was, no."
Despite the fact that plaintiffs' proof failed to
show the grazing of a single mining claim for even
a day from 1945 to 1957, their case was even weaker
after cross examination since Castango did not even
7
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know which numng claims were invoked in this
litigation.
Castagno also indicated that he couldn't tell
if he was trespassing and could not identify where
any particular claim was.
T 56-4 Q. "I ask you a question. I want
you to answer it, Mr. Castango, as to whether
or not you personally took a map and identified any one of these claims?
A. No.
Q. But you didn't take a map and try
to identify where these particular claims
were?
A. No.
Q. You knew, did you not, that some of
these trees had blazes on them with numbers
on them?
A. Yes."
T 91-29 When asked whether his cattle were
on Gold Coin, he claimed they were, and when it was
pointed out to him that Gold Coin claims were not
involved in this litigation, and he was asked to name
a single claim involved in this litigation and he
stated that he could, he named Gold Bug, and Gold
Bug is not a claim involved in this litigation T 9222.
Q. "You don't know whether your cattle
were on the Heclas or not do you?
A. No I don't."
The Heclas, constituting a group of five mining
8
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claims, was the largest area of claims (just north of
Mercur) involved in this case. The witness was
then asked:
T92-25 Q. "Alright, you can't identify
a single claim's name that your cattle were
on, can you?
A. Yes.
Q. \Vhich one?
A. Gold Bug.
Q. Gold Bug?
A. Yes.
Q. The Gold Bug isn't even involved in
this litigation.
A. It sure is."
Actually the Gold Bug claim is not involved in
this litigation as disclosed from the pleadings. Castagno also indicated he did not know where any
particular claim was or whether he was trespassing, T91-24. The questions and answers demonstrate
that the witness did not even know what mining
claims were involved in this litigation much less
their location or whether he had grazed any of them.
From 1957 to 1960 Rose Castagno was the immediate predecessor to plaintiff. Rose Castagno was
even more confused than was Tony Castagno. She
did not even know where the claims were located
with respect to Sparrow Hawk Spring or the Milk
Ranch, T62-6. She did not even know where the
grave yard was, which was identified as being on
9
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the northeast edge of the lower group of claims,
T64-14.
Plaintiff, Russell claimed he sta1·ted grazing
in the spring of 1961, T25-16. Russell had no map
to identify where the mining claims were. T35-20.
He never did locate any particular claim, T36-1.
He admitted that he knew that Ault's livestock had
grazed the area where he purportedly thought said
mining claims were located for a period of ten years,
Tl4-9. He also admitted that he knew that Ault
had been operating sheep in the area for up to 20
years, Tl3-28, and he knew that Ault leased from
the Bothwells, Tl4-27.
Under all of plaintiff's evidence there was not
a scintilla of evidence to show that any particular
claim had ever been grazed in any particular single
year or for any period, even one day. Yet the lower
court found:
"3. For many years last past plaintiffs
and their predecessor in interest have used
the surface of said mining claims for livestock grazing."
The evidence is conclusive that Ault, defendant's lessee, had exclusive possession of and grazed
all of said mining claims from and after 1944.
Ault claimed that he never at any time had
any interfe1·ence by Castagno in grazing said claims,
T155-30.
The defendant Russell under his testimony
claimed that subsequent to 1961 he grazed part of
10
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the claims in common with Ault; however, the
transcript discloses the following evidence from
Ault: Tl55-30

Q. "Did Mr. Castagna ever run any
sheep or cattle on any of the claims that you
were leasing from Bothwell?
A. Never run any sheep on there that I
know anything about.
Q. Never had any sheep on any of
them?
A. No."
Mr. Mervin Russell plaintiff testified that he
ran sheep in common with those of Ault and Ault
upon being cross examined by counsel as to whether
or not Russell ever had any livestock on said claims
Ault answered:
T 199-84 "There has been no sheep in
there outside of mine at no time.
Q. You are positive of that?
A. I am positive of it."
Moreover, Ault's cattle consumed all of the
growth available for grazing and he observed it
and so testified, Tl67-5 and testified that only his
cattle had been in the area since 1944, T167-19.
The Mercur Bench area is where the lower
group of mining claims are located and when Ault
was asked whether he had seen anybody's cattle on
this lower group of claims since 1945, he testified
that he had not, Tl 70-21 to 28. \Vhen he was speci11
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fically asked whether he had seen Castagno's or
Russell's cattle up by Sparrow Hawk or near the
northern groups of claims in connection with the
water that was used and he indicated he had not
and that no one had interferred with same, T-15918.
Ault stated he built a reservoir about seven
years ago near the Sparrow Hawk Spring which
spring is shown on Ex. 19 as being on the south
easternly portion of the Black Shale claim involved
in this litigation, and it was not disputed that there
was not water in the water trough by said spring,
Castagna T278-18, Ault T235-30, except as turned
therein through the pipe.
Ault indicated he leased said mining claims
every year since 1944, ran sheep on them and paid
rental for the use of said claims, and that he never
missed a payment on said lease, Tl54-9; and that
prior to the commencement of this action he never
complained aobut anyone else using said claims,
Tl55-17; and p1·ior to 1964 he never complained to
the Bothwells about Russell trespassing, Tl55-19;
and he never complained to Bothwell about Castagna trespassing, Tl55-28; and that Castagno
never ran any cattle on any of the claims he was
leasing from Bothwell, T155-30. After Ault built
the reservoir no one elses cattle used the same,
T158-16. Russell could not get in to use the Hecla
claims or the Mary Jean claims or the Douglas claim
without trespassing on other claims leased by Ault,
12
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Tl61-9. Neither Russell nor the Castagnos ever
grazed said claims, Tl61-18. Ault had no trouble
with either Castagno or Russell running their sheep
north of Mercur, Tl67-2, and no one else ever ran
any livestock near the Milk Ranch since 1944,
Tl67-19. Ault leased the mining claims known as
the Milk Ranch since 1944, Tl68-4. Milk ranch was
on claims Ault leased but not involved in this case
and was west of the Hecla group see Ex. 18, and
Tl56-9. Ault was in the area during the grazing
seasons several times a week, Tl68-24. No cattle
excep Aults were near the Heclas, Tl 70-14 since
1945, Tl 70-24. Ault visited the spring near Sparrow Hawk nearly every day, Tl80-27, and he examined the area and found that no cattle had ever
watered there except his own, Tl 79-26. All of the
water that left the spring was contained within a
pipe and none escaped, Tl92-22. They had a big
box with a lock and a key where they could turn
the water out, T224-30, and all of the water ran
to Mercur, T234-12; Ault passed the area practically every day, Tl81-21. Ault claimed that no other
cattle had ever been in the Milk Ranch area Tl9821, and he was positive of it, Tl99-8.
All water at Sparrow Hawk Spring flowed into
a pipe and all of it went to Mercur and the water
had to be turned out of the pipe to put any water
tn the trough or in the reservoir, Tl93-14. There
was a box over the spring which had to be unlocked
to control or release any water, T224-27. No water
13
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flowed out of the mine and was all contained within the pipe, and was turned out of the pipe into the
trough, Tl96-2, and was all under Bothwell's or
Ault's control.
Ault was at the reservoir almost every day
and there was no evidence that anyone else even
used the water that he placed in the same, T222-17,
and no livestock but his own used said reservoir,
Tl 79-30, as was disclosed from his visits practically every day, T-180-27.
A son of Ault's herded sheep for him for about
20 years, T283-20 between Sunshine Canyon and
the grave yard which included all of the mining
claims in the lower group which made a complete
circle for grazing as is shown colored green on Ex.
18, and ( Ault's son) never saw any of Castagno's
sheep in said area at any time, and he grazed Ault's
sheep there, T284-l 7, until all of the feed was gone,
T284-18. Mrs. Ault, the wife of lessor, had knowledge
of Aults sheep grazing there and hauled water into
this area to water the sheep, T213-19 and had
personal knowledge of her husband placing sheep
on the southern area of claims, T214-20 and on the
Black Sheep claim T230-18, and knew that her husband had had sheep in Mercur Canyon since 1922,
T-224-5, and Ault himself had never seen any other
livestock on the Mercur Bench area or the southern
group of claims, T170-22.
The claims were even named that were involved
14
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

in this litigation and Ault was asked if he had seen
any persons cattle or sheep on any of said claims
01· on any of the land marked in green on Ex. 18
and he stated that he saw neither sheep or cattle
grazing said area, Tl59-21 to 30, Tl60-l to 10.
Again these specific questions were asked Ault
whether or not he had seen Russell or any of his
herds try to graze the Heclas or any of the group
marked in red on Ex. 19 and he stated he had not
Tl61-18. Ault was asked if it was necessary for
others to trespass on other claims Ault leased in
order to graze the Hecla claims. He replied they had
to trespass, Tl61-9.
Since the court in equity reviews the facts as
well as the law, counsel takes the position that
plaintiff has not only failed to carry the burden of
proof but the evidence is conclusive that defendant
Geyser-Marion has exercised complete exclusive control and possession of all claims involved in this litigation through its lessee Ault since 1944.
Respondent did introduce some evidence of
cattle being near Milk Ranch, no year was stated,
and Milk Ranch area is 3 miles from the lower
groups of claims and a mile and a half from Black
Shale Claim in the upper group, and not adjacent
to or near any claim involved in this litigation,
Tl56-9 and see Ex. 18.
15
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ARGUMENT ON THE LAvV

POINT II.
GENERALLY THE INSTRUMENT IS CONSTRUED IN FAVOR OF THE GRANTEE. AND FEE SIMPLE
TITLE IS PRESUMED TO HAVE PASSED TO GRANTEE.

The fore part of this point is copied directly
from Meager vs. Uintah Gas Co., 255 P 2d 989, 123
U 123. In the Meager case, the Supreme Court of
Utah quotes 16 Am Jur 530; 23 Am Jur 2nd has
since superceded 16 Am Jur, and the following
quotes appea1· to show the recent trend to resolve
all doubts against the Grantor, and to transfer the
largest interest Gran tor could convey:
23 Am Jur 2d 212 Para. 165 CONSTRUCTION IN FAVOR OF GRANTEE
"Most courts agree that if there is any
ambiguity rendering a deed subject to alternative constructions, that construction will be
adopted which is more favorable to the Grantee than to the Grantor, all doubts being resolved against the Grantor. This rule of construction is particularly applicable to avoid
limitations on the grant, restraints upon alienation, or to prevent an unreasonable result.
It is made statutory in some jurisdictions.
The rule is predicated upon the reasoning that since a grant is expressed in words
of the Grantor's own selection, it is, prima
facie ,an expression of his intention, and he
is therefore chargeable with the language
used. If, therefore, the deed can inure in different ways, the Grantee, it is said, may take
16
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it in such way as will be most to his advantage. Thus, where ambiguous or uncertain in
such respect, a deed is usually regarded as
conveying the largest interest which the Grantor could convey."
The Grantors by the first grant were very
articulate and reserved the surface and water rights.
However, under the second grant Ex. 2, Grantors
granted and vested all interest in all mining claims
in said Grantee. This was done in the fore part of
the deed. Thereafter, having intended that all of
the interest was vested in said Grantee, the Grantor, without using words of "reservation" or "subject to" or like words intended to limit the grant;
The second grant contained the following
words:
"Grantee agrees that Grantor shall have the
right to use the surf ace of the ground for
grazing purposes."
This shows no intent to limit the grant or reserve any right. Neither does it show said license
was a perpetual license.
This further demonstrates that the intent of
the parties was that the Grantee be vested with
all of the title without limitation since Grantee
would be powerless to make an agreement with respect to property Grantee did not own. After having received title without limitation Grantee could
only then agree to the Grantor's right to use, the
same and only on certain conditions.
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Section 57-1-3 U.C.A. 1953 provides:
"A fee simple is presumed to be intended
to pass by conveyance unless it appears from
the conveyance that a lesser estate was intended."
It does not appear from the instrument, Ex. 2,
that a lesser estate was intended.
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah in
Hanes vs. Hunt, 85 P 2d 861, made the distinction
between a liniitation upon a grant and a mere
license. The court states:
"The deed to Hunt also contained a clause,
'Reserving and excepting unto the grantor'
the grazing rights and the use of the water
for watering livestock. A reservation and exception from a grant is persuasive that the
grant was more than a license."
Even where the words reserving and excepting
grazing and water rights are used the court indicates it is only persuasive that the grant was more
than a license. It would therefore appear that the
absence of the use of the words reserving and excepting with no water would indicate that it was a
license.
In the case at bar while there was such limitation upon the first grant, there was no such limitation upon the second grant.
There was such a limitation upon the grant
in the first deed, and in 1936 before the GeyserMarion acquired the grant of the additional rights
under Ex. 2, it brought an action to quiet title with
18
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respect to only one of the claims involved in this
litigation. Since Geyser-Marion had not at that time
acquired the enlarged interest under the second
grant, recognition of the second grant by Jorgensens to Bothwell is shown in said decree by the fact
that the administrator of the Bothwell estate is
made a party to the action and rights reserved in
the first grant were not awarded to Geyser-Marion.
This was because Geyser-Marion did not receive
the enlarged rights under the second grant until
a number of years after the said decree had been
entered.
Counsel for plaintiffs overlooked the fact that
when Geyser-Marion commenced said action that
Geyser-Marion had not at that time acquired said
rights under the second grant, Ex. 2 when counsel
claimed it supported his cause in the lower court.
Continuing on in the habendum of Ex. 2 in the
case at bar the following is contained:
"The grazing to be done in such a manner as to not interfere with any mining that
the Gran tee elects to do."
Roberts vs. Lynn, 73 N.E. at 524
'"The question there, and in the case now
before us, is decided by determining whether,
as matter of construction, the contract gave
the other party exclusive possession of the
premises against the world, including the
owner, or gave him a license to occupy under
the owner, in which case the rights of the
other party rest in contract."
19
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Tips vs. U. S., 70 F 2d 525:
"A mere permission to use land, dominion over it remaining in the owner and no
interest in or exclusive possession of it being
given, is but a license. 35 C. J. Landlord &
Tenant Para. 10."
Since in the case at bar the defendant had the
right to mine and oust plaintiffs from the use of
the area being mined, said plaintiffs have only a
contract or license and not such an interest in land
as will support a quiet title action.
Saxman vs. Christmann, 79 P 2d 520:
"It is said in 17 Ruling Case Law 568,
Para. 81:
'Whether an instrument is a license or
a lease depends generally on the manifest intent of the parties gleaned from a consideration of its entire contents.'
Tested by this rule, there can be no question but that this permit is only a license to
use the land. The rule applicable to this permit is well stated in 17 Ruling Case Law 570,
Para. 83, as follows:
'A clearly defined distinction is drawn
by the authorities between agreements which
create a lease of the land for mineral purposes and those which are simply a license giving to the licensee authority to enter and
operate for minerals. While under a lease an
interest or estate in the land itself is created,
under a license the licensee has no interest
or estate in the land itself, but only in the
proceeds, and in such proceeds, not as realty,
20
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but as personal property, and his possession
is the possession of the owner. In general, a
contract simply giving a right to take ore
from a mine, no interest or estate being granted, confers a mere license, and the licensee
acquires no right to the ore until he separ.:.
ates it from the freehold. * * *' "
In the case at bar the only right that the plaintiffs had was the right to remove the forage from
the surface and no other. The evidence shows all
available water was used by Ault and none by plaintiffs. Not even the use of the springs which were
controlled with a key. In the first grant Grantor
was very articulate and reserved the right to the
surface water and the springs and thereafter the
same grantor made a second grant containing the
words "agreement" expressing the intent that it
constituted but an agreement and used the word
"use" signifying a license rather than a sole occupancy and specifying only grazing purposes subservient to (the main purpose of said land in the minds
of the parties,) to-wit: mining purposes. This all
gives strength to the position that having made a
second grant, grantor was not doing a useless act
but was parting with something retained under the
first grant to-wit: all surface rights. The words
used in the second grant are consistent with the conveying of all surface rights with only a conditional
license or contract. This is true without relying
upon the presumptions of the common law or 57-1-3
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U.C.A. 1953 which compel construing the same
against grantor, and conveying all interest or the
fee.
POINT III.
A SUIT TO QUIET TITLE MUST BE SUPPORTED
BY AN INTEREST IN LAND AND IS NOT THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY UPON A CONTRACT OR TO
ENFORCE RIGHTS UNDER A LICENSE.

Saxman vs. Christmann, 79 P 2d 521 the case
quoted above where the party could remove minerals supports this point, and the court held:
"Of course the defendant under the use
permit has rights that the law will protect,
but her rights are not such as to entitle her
to maintain the present action. If her occupancy or possession of the premises is wrongfully invaded she can resort to the action of
forcible entry and detainer as she or her predecesor in interest did as shown in Crismon
v. Christmann, 44 Ariz. 201, 36 P 2d 257.
The judgment of the lower court is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to dismiss the action."
The court above held that in a case where one '
could remove mineral, the remedy of plaintiff's
was not a quiet title action but a right under the
contract or an action against those interfering with
said right. Plaintiff's predecessors in interest parted with their interest in the claims under the second
grant, Ex. 2 and had only a conditional use for :
grazing purposes which is not such an interest in
land as will support a quiet title action as the lower
court granted.
22
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POINT IV.
AN ACTION UPON A CONTRACT OR TO PURSUE
REMEDIES UNDER A WRITTEN LICENSE MUST BE
COMMENCED WITHIN SIX YEARS.

Plaintiffs and Castagno had both actual knowledge and constructive notice of the fact that defendants leased to Ault and Ault grazed sheep on
said claims since 1945. An action to recover mesne
profits of real property or on a written contract
must be commenced within six years.
Defendants at R 45 plead 78-12-23 U.C.A.
1953. Defendant collected rental from Ault on all
claims for all years following 1945. Ault's livestock
grazed all of said claims under a contract with
defendants for all years since 1944. Defendants
had no notice of adverse claims from Ault Tl55-27
or by anyone, including Castagno or Russell, T-26611. Defendants refused to recognize Castagno after
Nordell assigned to him in 1945, Entry No. 154 of
the Absract, and defendants immediately leased said
claims to Ault for all years following said assignment. Plaintiff's predecessors Castagno must have
commenced any action within six years after Ault
used said claims for grazing purposes. This is true
because Castagno knew Ault was grazing sheep on
said claims T46-25, and actual knowledge is even
better than constructive notice, and Castagno stated
Ault's sheep were there from 1945 to 1956. To recover mesne profits of real property or grazing
rights if any they had, said action must have been
commenced within six years.
23
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Moreover, said predecessors were on notice that
1/2 of the general taxes must be paid as a condition of the right to graze (Entry 106 of the Abstract) and they never paid or tendered 1/2 of the
general taxes for any year since 1946 to maintain
said contract in good standing; therefore their rights
are lost.
POINT V.
A LICENSE IS NOT ASSIGNABLE AND DOES
NOT PASS WITH THE LAND.

The instrument, Ex. 2, under which plaintiffs
as the 4th assignees claim, omitted the words, "successors and assigns" with respect to plaintiff's predecessors or Grantor. Since the instrument is construed against said Grantor and most favorable to
Grantee, Grantor had only a personal right to graze
said claims, which right was not assignable.
33 Am J ur 403 Para. 98
"It is an element of a license in real property that it is a personal right, and such a
personal right, and such a license is, as such,
incapable of being assigned or transferred
by the person to whom it is granted, at least
in the absence of a provision in the instrument or agreement granting the license, which
authorizes assignment. It does not pass with
the land."
This is not a restrictive covenant that runs
with the land like the covenant in the Sine case 376
P 2d 940 where both parties sign a covenant that a ,
motel will not be erected on said property where the
cases have held that such a covenant runs with the
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land. Moreover, in a restrictive covenant no further
performance is required by either grantor or grantee to keep the same in force. In the case at bar the
grantor had only a license, not a restrictive covenant and the grantee agreed the said Grantor may
use said claims for grazing purposes, provided it
did not interfere with mining and grantor was to
pay one-half the general taxes.
The courts hold that a restrictive covenant runs
with the land. The common law holds otherwise
with respect to a license. Grantee had the right to
determine that other persons may be objectionable
in their grazing of said claims. Since the instrument is construed against Grantors, it must be assumed that Grantee approved the right of Grantor
to graze the same and reserved the right to determine whether said grazing right would or would
not be recognized in subsequent assignees.
Counsel may attempt to attach some significance to the fact that Nordell, an assignee of the
original Grantor was permitted to graze livestock
on said claims and did pay to defendants' predecessor one-half of the general taxes for the years,
1943, 1944 and 1945. However, an assignee of a
license may continue on and the licensor may accept
payments from an assignee of said licensee. This
does not make the license a perpetual license or is
the licensor prevented from refusing to recognize
any further assignments by having recognized one.
Moreover, it is more significant that the defendants
25
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not only refused to recognize Castagna, N ordell's
immediate assignee, but also refused to recognize
any assignee after Nordell. Also following the assignment by Nordell, defendants' immediately leased all of said claims to Owen Ault, who grazed livestock on all claims and paid all rental thereon for
all years after 1944. Castagna neither made complaints to defendants about Ault grazing sheep nor
did he claim any grazing rights despite the fact that
he well knew Ault was leasing said claims from defendant and grazing sheep on said claims. The only
time Castagna complained to Ault was once in 1945,
T 48-11, Plaintiff had the burden and did not show
otherwise. The law should presume that Ault was
not so stupid as to pay rental for grazing purposes
for 20 years on mining claims others were grazing.
POINT VI.
NEITHER PARTY CAN ENFORCE A MUTUAL
COVENANT AGAINST THE OTHER WITHOUT SHOW- '
ING PERFORMANCE OR A TENDER OF PERFORMANCE ON HIS OWN PART.

This point is copied word for word from 14
Am J ur 499 Para. 12.
Plaintiffs have the burden of proof to show
performance. The claim of adverse possession as
set forth as plaintiff's position in the pre-trial order
is a claim of acquiring said right by hostile, adverse,
possession. Such a position is repugnant to and inconsistant with specific performance or mutual performance. It also totally lacks the elements of "he
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who seeks equity must do equity" or "performance"
or "showing a tender of performance" or "clean
hands." Moreover, plaintiffs never did claim performance and could not when as an alternative
remedy they claimed by adverse possession. Russell
testified that he was acquainted with the claims for
30 years, T6-4, and that he knew of Aults operation
in the area for 15 to 20 years Tl3-29, and Russell
knew Ault leased from Bothwell. This was all before he obtained his alleged grazing rights. Russell
also knew the claims were not used for mining purposes T 22-6 and that Owen Ault was leasing said
claims and using the same for grazing purposes.
From the record plaintiff was also charged with
knowledge of the fact that to enjoy grazing rights
one-half of the general taxes must have been paid
to defendant. Yet he had no information concerning whether any predecessors had or had not paid
one-half of said taxes, Tl8-13. Plaintiff never tendered any taxes or any portion of same to defendant even though he claimed to have grazed said
claims for three years. Plaintiffs neither plead nor
carried the burden of proof of "confession and
avoidance" by confessing they owed one-half of the
taxes on a plea to avoid payment. Moreover the facts
neither supported a prima facie case for the relief
which the court granted, nor did they show a contract if one was in force.
27
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POINT VII.
A PARTY SEEKING TO QUIET TITLE TO REALTY, OR REMOVE A CLOUD THEREON WILL, AS A
CONDITION PRECEDENT TO THE RELIEF, BE COMPELLED TO DO EQUITY.

This point is a direct quote from 74 C.J.S. 142
Par. 94.
Plaintiffs claimed under the pre-trial order R
46, that they were entitled to possession by reason
of adverse possession. Such a position supported by
some evidence that they had used the land for grazing without tendering one-half of the taxes for the
use they had made or will in the future make is
offensive to equity or the requirement that '"he who
seeks equity must do equity" which should require
judgment for defendants. This is particularly true
where the recorder's office charges them with notice.
POINT VIII.
PAYMENT OF ALL TAXES ASSESSED AGAINST
ALL MINING CLAIMS AND COLLECTING ALL RENTALL FROM A TENANT WHO USED SAID CLAIMS
FOR GRAZING PURPOSES WITH NO NOTICE TO
DEFENDANTS OF ADVERSE CLAIMS SINCE 1945
EXTINGUISHED ANY RIGHTS OF PLAINTIFFS AND
ESTABLISHED TITLE IN DEFENDANT.

Where the owner of land leases it to a tenant
who annually without interruption pays rental thereon with no complaints of any adverse claims, or
others using the land since 1945, the owner is pre·
sumed to have exclusive possession, and has extinguised any rights of others whether by license con·
tract or otherwise. Under these facts, plaintiffs and
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the predecessors must be presumed either to have
ubandoned their rights or recognized that the contract was not assignable and that they had no rights.
Castagno saw Aults cattle on what he thought were
the claims involved in the year 1945, T 46-22. Castagno talked with Ault at that time, and it must be
presumed that Castagna either concluded he had no
rights or abandoned any he had since there is no
further evidence of any discussion, or complaints
after 1945 by Castagna.
Moreover, where defendant has paid all taxes
assessed on the claims since 1934, plaintiffs have no
claim or right of any kind much less the right to
enjoin this defendant from interfering with their
use of said claims.
After defendants plead and proved exclusive
use and collection of all the rentals on all mining
claims since 1944 and proved payment of all the
taxes on all mining claims since 1934, and that
they had never had any notice, actual or constructive, of anyone interfering with the possessory rights
of their tenant, defendant should prevail. There was
direct uncontradicted evidence that defendants had
no notice of adverse claims, T268-1, and there was
no evidence to the contrary. In the other hand, all
clefen nan ts' predecessors and the world knew defendants had leased said claims to Ault, and that Ault
was using said claims for grazing purposes and
paying rent to defendant for said grazing rights.
Plaintiffs not only had the burden of proof
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but also offered no proof to the contrary or offered
any proof that anyone complained to defendants
or their p1·edecesors in interest or gave them any
notice of any adverse claims or trespass, or that
there was any reason why a reasonable person should
have known of adverse claims under constructive
notice, since rental was paid annually without complaint and Ault testified he never complained to
defendant about Castagno being on the property,
T155-27.
Defendant also plead, 78-12-5.1, 78-12-5.2, 7812-12.1 R 21 and 78-12-12, U.C.A. 1953 R 45 which
under the facts should not only prevent the relief ,
granted plaintiff by the lower court but also establish all rights in said claims in defendant. Let the
plaintiff show the court any evidence that will support plaintiffs seven years possession and payment
of taxes immediately prior to the commencement of
this action or at any time.
POINT IX.
A SUCCESSOR TO A GRANT IS ESTOPPED TO
ASSERT ANYTHING IN DEROGATION OF THE DEED
AS AGAINST A GRANTEE OR THOSE IN PRIVITY
WITH HIM.

After the recording of Ex. 2 on May 24, 1934,
all subsequent assignees of the Jorgensens including
all of plaintiffs' predecessors in inte1·est and plaintiffs were put on notice that there was no severence
of the surface rights or use of water rights. The
only right retained was a conditional license which
30
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was not assignable and which was conditioned upon
using the land so as not to interfere with mining,
and upon the payment of one-half of the general
taxes.
Being on notice, plaintiffs and their predecessors could acquire no greater interest in said claims
than was retained by their assignor. The point above
stated was for the most part copied from 31 C.J.S.
298.
Moreover, a grantor or his successor is estopped
from giving full force and effect to the conveyance.
Ex. 2, See 31 C.J.S. 298. Also the statute 57-1-3
U.C.A. 1953 requires plaintiffs to regard the fee
as having passed under Ex. 2 to defendants.
In addition, the third time the Jorgensens con\'eyed to Nordell, Entry 110 of the Abstract, both
Nordell and plaintiffs were on notice that all Nordell received was "The grazing rights upon." They
were then required to look to the information shown
in Entry 106 of the Abstract to see how limited those
rights were. They were limited to grazing only so
as not to interfere with mining and grazing was
permitted only upon payment of one-half of the
general taxes. Moreover, said rights were not avai1able to an assignee of grantor or a licensee as shown
by the instrument itself.
POINT X.
EQUITY WILL NOT ENTER AN ORDER IMPOSSIBLE TO ENFORCE AND WHICH INVITES TRES-

PASS.

Ex. 18 shows that the claims involved which
31
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ai·e neai· Mercm· ai·e scatte1·ed also see Ex. 19. Castagno admitted he had to trespass on other claims
to get to the claims here involved and that said
claims are, T91-18, landlocked to the plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs have no right of way over the many other
claims which surround said other claims here involved. The Hecla claims numbered 3079 and shown
in green on Ex. 18 are immediately above the word
Mercur, and are more than 1~ miles below the
Black Shale claim 3029 as shown on Ex. 18, since
claim 3079 extends more than half way southerly
through section 5 and 3029 extends part way into
section 30 two sections above. In other words, plaintiffs will be required to trespass over 11/2 miles of
other claims leased by Ault in 01·der to graze the
Hecla claims.
Ex. 14 is the w1·itten lease under which defendants leased 608 acres or all of the claims involved in this litigation to Owen Ault. Said lease
also involved many other claims, to-wit: 2,200 acres
of claims all of which are leased to Ault, which together with other claims leased by Ault from GeyserMarion and from McCormick et al comprise a solid
block which Ault has colored in green on Ex. 18.
The small area of 608 acres is for the most part
surrounded by other claims leased by defendant to
Ault. The map Ex. 18 and the larger map, Ex. 19
demonstrate that the other claims which are not in·
volved in this litigation and which are leased by
defendant to Ault not only sulTound all of the claims
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near Mercur which are involved in this litigation
but make it impossible for plaintif to have access to
them without a trespass on defendants' other claims.
This is demonstrated by the fact that plaintiff cannot get to Heclas without trespassing over the three
Seal claims 3180, Annapolis 3184, Victor 3144,
South Geyser, Scribner 3260, Sparrow Hawk and
West Geyser 4944 which claims are leased to Ault
by defendant and are not involved in this suit but
which claims surround the Hecla group and with
other claims leased by Ault make it impossible for
plaintiff to get into graze the Hecla group without
trespassing over 1:Y2 miles of other claims leased
by Ault. The plaintiff cannot have access to said
claims and it is impossible for plaintiff to use same
or grazing or for any other purposes without trespassing upon the other 1,593 acres of other claims
leased by defendant to Ault, as well as trespassing
upon about 1,000 acres of other claims leased by
Ault from McCormick et al.
Plaintiffs have no contiguous or adjacent claims
and no right of way to enter on said claims. Defendants will be in contempt of court if they refuse
to permit plaintiff to graze said 608 acres of claims
and plaintiffs will be in trespass upon said 2,500
acres, in order to graze same. This is true except
only fo1· several small claims not near Mercur but
involving a small area disconnected from the Mercur area and southwest of Mercur or the southerly
end by the Black Sheep claim. Should equity enter
33
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a decree which will invite trespass and is hopeless
to enforce?
POINT XI.
A WRITTEN CONTRACT TO CONVEY REAL
PROPERTY IS MERGED INTO A DEED.

The above point is copied word for word from
Knight vs. Southern Pacific, 172 P. 693 -U-.
Ex. 17 was not the contract which resulted in the
deed, Ex. 2. Plaintiff did not prove that it was. The
court erred in receiving it into evidence. Moreover,
the court gave significant consideration to it, which
was error. See R 65, where the court bases its decision on said contract and not on Ex. 2.

The photostat attached to the last cover sheet
shows that the courts not only support the law as
stated by the Utah Supreme Court but declare prior
contracts null and void and of no further effect.
Respectfully submitted,
MARK & SCHOENHALS
E. L. Schoenhals
903 Kearns Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for
Defendant and Appellant
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